Liberty of conscience   

The Archbishop of Canterbury caused a storm earlier in the year (2008) by suggesting that it was ‘inevitable that some aspects of Sharia law would be incorporated into English law'. It appears from the subsequent ‘clarification' that he was asking that the law should allow greater room for religious people to act in accordance with their consciences. He did not give any concrete examples. As a matter of principle, however, I do not consider it to be right that anyone should be able to act in (in the name of conscience) in a way which would deny someone-else their rights under the law. And as an extension of that, neither should anyone be put under social or religious pressure to accept a non-civil jurisdiction. How greater ‘liberty of conscience' than we already have can be achieved is not at all clear to me.

Although reference has been made to the recognition of the judgements of Jewish courts (in connection with Jewish divorces) as a justification for the giving of rights to Sharia courts, this is based on a misunderstanding. As with many religions, Judaism does not recognise civil divorce for the purpose of remarriage in a Synagogue. The subsequent children of an orthodox Jewish woman who does not have a Jewish divorce - a ‘Get' - will have an inferior status under orthodox Jewish religious law and practice. Neither they nor their successors will be able to marry an orthodox Jew in a synagogue or be properly part of the Jewish orthodox community. Whether or not a Get is entered into is, however, entirely a matter for the two individuals concerned. There can be no compulsion. Under English law, however, one party to a marriage can ask the court to impose a divorce. This could leave the unwilling (religiously inclined) person divorced under the civil law, but still married under Jewish religiious law.

The Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, however, allows either party to ask the divorce court to impose, as a condition on the final grant of the divorce, that a Get first be obtained from the Jewish Court (the Beth Din), thus freeing both parties from each other for all purposes, both religious and civil. As Jewish divorce is based on consent, the jurisdiction of the Beth Din is purely formal. Having the means of obtaining a Get, however prevents a type of religious blackmail from being exerted by one party on the other. I therefore see no problem with it, but neither do I see it as giving the green light to giving jurisdiction to Sharia courts other than in an analogous fashion.

Of course, with the consent of both parties to a contractual dispute or even in respect of a claim for damages for personal injury, there is no need to go through the normal court process. If the parties can agree on a settlement, with or without the help of a mediator, whether religious or not, then that settlement will be binding on them.

If the parties wish to use a court system, without going to a state-run court, then there is always arbitration. In this instance, the parties jointly appoint someone to as the judge, but they call him an arbitrator instead. However for the arbitration to be binding on both parties, it must have been conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Act 1996. This applies to Moslems just as much as to Christians, Jews or atheists, so no actual recognition of a religious law system is required or indeed appropriate. Justice should be independent of one's religious beliefs. So, to base an arbitration decision on the idea, as Sharia law apparently requires, that the testimony of a woman is worth only half that of a man would not be lawful. It would not reach the standards imposed by the Arbitration Act. Section 1 of the Act says: "(a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal...;". And so all evidence must be given proper weight.

So should there be exemptions from the law based on religious or other beliefs? Already, doctors and others who do not wish to perform abortions or give contraceptive advice on religious grounds, are exempted from doing so, but that is only because there are plenty of others who will do so - thus the rights of the patient can still be met. But should religious people be able to go further and discriminate against people on racial grounds or those of sexual proclivity? Well, as a democracy, we have decided what the rules are and I see no reason why any particular minority group should be exempt from something which we regard as being fair for members of society in general. If they have discriminatory views or if they preach hatred of certain groups of people in society based, not on what breaches of the law they have committed, but simply on who they are, then they should not be excused simply on the ground of so-called ‘conscience'.

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